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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the connections between the shiftof world saving
toward OPEC and the changing structure of U.S.trade with the non—oil
developing countries. The basic point of thepaper is that during the
l970s, the U.S. economy has become more interdependentthrough trade with
the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in thedeveloping world. The
shift of world saving toward OPEC in the l97Oseffectively international-
ized the supply of saving, as OPEC places itssurplus in the international
financial system. The NICs and otherdeveloping countries borrow the surplus
and direct it to domestic investment. Investmentin the NICs stimulates
the demand for U.S. capital goods. The reallocationof resources towards
capital goods production in the U.S. stimulates excess demand forconsumer
goods, which appear as imports from the NICs. U.S.exports of capital
goods to these countries have grown rapidly in the 197Os,as have U.S.
imports of non—food, non—auto consumer goods from them. Thus thestructure
of U.S. trade has been reoriented to becomecomplementary with the rapidly—










This paper explores the connections between the shift of world saving
toward OPEC and the changing structure of U.S. trade with the non—oil
developing countries. The basic point of the paper is that during the
1970's, the U.S. economy has become more interdependent through trade
with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in the developing world.
U.S. exports of capital goods to these countries have grown rapidly, as
have U.S. imports of non—food, non—auto consumer goods. Thus the structure
of U.S. trade has been reoriented to become complementary with the rapidly—
growing developing countries. Formulation of U.S. foreign economic policy
should be sensitive to this change.
The basic facts are presented in tables in the paper. Tables 1 and 2
show the growth of the developing countries in the 1970's, which was not
slowed appreciably by the OECD recession. Table 5 shows the high level of
investment and rapid growth of the NICs, in particular. The extent of bor-
rowing by these countries is well—known, and the numbers are shown in
Tables 3 and 4.Essentially, the NICs borrowed the OPEC surplus, invested,
and grew. The changing structure of U.S. trade is shown in Tables 6 through
10. In Table 6 we see the shift of U.S. trade toward surpluses in capital
goods and agriculture that approximately finance the deficit on energy.
In Tables 7 and 8 the growth of U.S. exports of capital goods to the de-
veloping countries is shown. From 1975—1980 these grew at an annual rate
of 11.2 percent in real terms. In 1970, 30 percent of U.S. capital goods
exports went to the developing countries; by 1980 the fraction was 42 per-
cent. In Tables 9 and 10 we see a similar development of U.S. imports of2.
non—food, non—auto consumer goods.
The paper interprets these changes as follows. Theshift of world
saving toward OPEC effectively internationalizedthe supply of saving,
as OPEC places its surplus in the internationalfinancial system. The
ICs and other developing countries borrow the surplusand direct it to
domestic investment. Investment in the NICs stimulatesthe demand for
U.S. capital goods. The reallocation of resourcestowards capital goods
production in the U.S. stimulates excessdemand for consumer goods, which
appear as imports. Thus the resourceshifts as the U.S. make its economy
more complementary to the developing countries,and perhaps more conpetitive
with Europe and Japan.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Insection II we briefly
review models of interdependence, and argue thatthe channel that allocates
world saving to local investment is increasing in importance.In section
III we show the pattern of borrowing, investment,and growth in developing
countries. Then in section IV we discuss the changingstructure of U.S.
trade. The numbers give the impression of an economyin the process of re-
source reallocation toward its comparative advantagein a world of inter-
action between financial flows and trade.3.
II. Models of Macroeconomic Interpndence
A basic argument of this paper is that the rise of OPEC as a supplier
of world saving has made growth in developing countries less dependenton
the OLCD countries. In this section we will sketch the basic theoretical
framework for studying interdependence between the OECD (and U.S.) and the
developing countries (DCs). We will focus here on "macro—level" inter-
dependence, to draw a distinction with "structural interdependence" between
the U.S. and the DCs, which is discussed below in section IV.
By interdependence at the macro level we mean interdependence of
aggregate variables such as GNP or the price level between countries
or regions.At this level, interdependence can work through many channels.
Movements in demand in one country can spill over into demand for another's
exports, and this in turn can feed back into the country originating the
disturbance. There are in the economics literature models with various
levels of complexity that focus on trade as a channel of interdependence.
Examples are found in Robinson (1952) and Branson—Rotemberg (1980). We
will call these "demand side" links.
Another family of economic models focuses on the world allocation
of saving and investment through international capital markets. In the
extreme version of this model, with "perfect" capital mobility, all saving
flows into a world pool, and is then allocated to national investment
according to relative expected real rates of return. In this model an
increase in saving in the U.S. would show up as an increase in investment
in the developing countries, but increased investment in the U.S. would
draw capital away from the developing countries. We will call this the
"supply—side" link; a good recent paper giving a sophisticated version4.
is Lipton—Sachs (1980). The rise of OPEC as a world investorwith capital
seeking a high and safe return has increased the relevanceof this model
in the l97Os.
A._______________ Demand-side Links
To illustrate the variety and complexity of interdependencethrough
demand—side links, we will summarize three fairly simplemodels that analyze
interactions between two countries. The first is aone—commodity purchas-
ing—power—parity model, taken from Branson—Rotemberg(1980). The second is
the two—commodity fixed—price model of Robinson (1952).The last is the
two—commodity model with flexible prices of B,ranson—Rotemberg(1980). Even
in this overly simplified model the complexities are apparent:it is quite
possible that an increase in demand in one areareduces putput in the
other
1.One commodity with rigid wages
We begin by describing the simplest macro modelthat yields interesting
results for the effects of demand policy. Wewill just outline the argument
and summarize a results here. Technicaldetails are presented in Branson—
Rotemberg (1980).
Think of a world of two countries, each producingthe same good
(the "schmoo"). Trade is free, so if the priceof the good in the tiforeigni?
country is P, the price the"home" country must be P =eP*.The exchange
rate e simply translates the foreign priceinto the home price. Suppose
in the foreign country ——WesternEurope is a good example ——real
wages are fixed by indexation.But in the home country money wages5.
ar fixed by custom or contract in the short run. Finally, let us make
th standard assption that employers viii expand output and empioent
if their output price rises relative to the wage rate.
Consider now what happens if demand is expanded, by monetary or
fiscal policy in Western Europe. This pulls up wages and prices there,
with no effect on output or employment, demand expansion is purely in-
flationary. But what happens in the United States? The expansion in
demand in Western Europe spills over into demand for U.S. exports. As
U.S. prices rise relative to wage rates, output and employment rise.
Thus this demand stimulus in Western Europe is purely inflationary there.
It reduces the European trade surplus and the U.S. trade deficit. Fi-
nally, the expansion in Europe increases output and employment in the
U.S. It is easy to see why the U.S. argued for demand stimulus in Europe
in 1976 and the Europeans resisted.
If, however, money wages were sticky in Europe as well as the U.S.,
the result would be different. The demand stimulus in Europe would raise
prices, output, and employment in both Europe and the U.S. The European
trade surplus and the U.S. deficit would be reduced. This is the model
the U.S. side of the 1976—78 discussion probably had in mind. Branson—
Rotemberg (1980) argue that it is not appropriate for most of Europe,
and Japan, where real wage rates tend to be more sticky.
What is the effect of growth in the developing countries in this
model? If growth rates increast autonomously in the developing world
(due, perhaps, to an improvement in policy or efficiency), demand for the6.
exports of both the U.S. and Europewill increase. In Europe, with real
wage rigidity, this willincrease the trade surplus and inflation, but
not employment or output. In the U.S.,with sticky money wages, employ—
ment and output will rise, as well.
2. Two commoditieswith rigid prices
Another model giving the same general and clear—cutresult that a demand
expansion in one country raises output inthe others through the trade chan-
nel is the two—country multiplier model of RomneyRobinson (1952). In Robin—
son's framework, each country produces a different good, orbundle of goods,
but movements of relative prices are suppressedin the analysis, to focus on
the Keynesian demand—side multiplier mechanism.
In the Robinson model, each country's importsfrom the other depends on
its own level of output (and income). Each country's exportsare the other's
imports. what is the effect of apolicy—induced demand expansion in this
model? Suppose demand is stimulated byfiscal or monetary policy in Europe.
This increases income in Europe by a Keynesianmultiplier mechanism. This
raises European imports from the U.S.Income rises in the U.S. yia a Keynesian
multiplier. This, in turn, raises importsfrom Europe, starting a second
round of multiplier effects.
The Robinson repercussion model is illustratedin Figure 1. U.S. in-
come y is given on thevertical axis, and European income on the horizontal
axis. The y(y) line shows the dependenceof U.S. income on Europe, and the
y*(y) line shows the dependence of European income onthe U.S. Equilibrium
income in both countries is at theintersection of the two curves.V

















Fiscal expansion in Europe isillustrated by the outward shift in
y*(y)• The movement in European income frompointzero to point 1 is
the Keynesian expansion without
feedback from the U.S. The movement
from point 1 to point 2 in the
additional international trade multiplier.
This provides expansion in U.S. income,and a further increase in European
income. Clearly the moresensitive each country's incomeis to movements
onthe other,the greater will be the addition tothe multiplier.
An increase in the exchange rate e,defined as units of home—currency
*
(y)per unit of foreign currency(y )——a devaluation of y'scurrency——Will
* *
shiftthe y(y )functionup and the y (y) functionleft. The devaluation
*
ofa y's currency shiftswould demand toward y output and awayfrom y
This moves the equilibrium in Figure1 upand to the left, raising y and
*
reducingy .Thisis a stark example of aeeggar_thy_neighb0r' devaluation
in y.
The Robinson repercussions model
is the basis for most thinkingabout
the demand—side link throughtrade. At its beginning, ProjectLink was a
many—country version of theRobinson model, for example. However,even it
is more complicated than necessary.
If prices are to be held constant,
there is not much point in
introducing two goods, and one canthink just as
well in termsofthe one—conmiodity model insection A—i. If one wants to9.
introduce two goods, then relative pricechanges should also be considered.
Whenthepossibility is allowed, the situation changes substantially,
however.
3. Twocommodities,flexible prices
The Robinson model yields clear—cut results forinterdependence by
assumingfixed prices. In that case the international trade feedbacksadd
to the standard Keynesian multipliers. However, theassumption of fixed
prices is crucial. In the last half—dozenyears, several papers have noted
thatwithprices adjustin, the cross—country multiplierscan become
negative:a demandexpansion in onecountry can lead to a contraction of
output in another. Branson-Rotemberg (1950)arguethat this may be an im-
portant element in the relations between the U.S. and the rest of themajor
OECD countries (Europe and Japan).
We can see how this possibility arises just bystudying labor supply
and demand in one country. Consider a situation in which eachof two countries
specializes in production of one good, and they trade. The relevantprice
level for producers on the demand side of the labor market is theprice of
the home good P. However, workers consume both goods, the homegood with
price P, and the import with price P. The relevant price level for labor
supply decisions is the CPI, which is weighted average of P and P. Thus
the demand for labor depends on P,; as P rises the demand for laborincreases.
The supply of labor is responsive to both P and P. When eitherrises, the
supply curve shifts up as workers demand higher wages. Equilibriumemploy-
ment in this situation is shown noN0 in Figure 2.Figure 2: Labor MarketEqui1ibri













Nowconsider what happens when demand rises abroad, pulling up P
This increases the CPI, and reduces the real wage labor receives. This
"terms of trade effect" shifts the labor supply function in Figure 2 up,
reducing employment and output at home. Thus it is possible that the demand
expansion in one country reduces output in the other through the terms—of-
trade effect. This theoretical possibility was noted by Argy and Salop
(1979) and Sachs (1979), and Branson—Rotemberg (1980) argue that it may be
a reasonable characterization of reaction in western Europe and Japan to ex-
pansion in the U.S.
The relevance of these results for interdependence between the U.S.
and developing countries results from consideration of the US—Europe—Japan
relationship. Assume for a moment that most developing countries and the
U.S. have sticky money wages, but that Europe and Japan follow the model of
Figure 2. Then an expansion of demand in the U.S. could reduce output in
Europe and Japan. The total effect on demand for the output of the develop-
ing countries would be unclear; it would depend on the weights of the U.S.
vs Europe and Japan on their exports. Similarly, the effect of an expansion
in demand in the developing countries on the U.S. would be unclear. The con—
tractionary result in Europe could outweigh the expansionary effect from the
developing countries.
These complexities and ambiguities arise in the simplest of models when
we consider carefully supply—side effects. Their empirical importance and rel-
evance for policy are not clear now; research in this area is only beginning.—'
But at least this tells us to beware of reliance on simple demand—side
multiplier models of trade interaction.
_/It is a principal focus of the research program in Comparative Macroeconomics
within the Program in International Studies at the National Bureau of
Economic Research.12.
B.Supply—side or Financial Market Links
Thesecond major channel of macro—levelinterdependence between
the U.S. and the developingcountries is through theinternational al-
location ofworld saving to national investment.I will call this the
"supply—side"link. Since saving is allocatedto investment needs
throughinternational financial markets, wecould also call this the
"financial"or "saving_investment"channel.
1hatever w name it, this isthe international financialmechanism
that allocates world saving todomestic investment. The riseof OPEC
asa world saverproviding its surplus tothe financial markets has
probably increased the importanceof this channel in the 1970s,and may
make itsimplications crucial for the1980s and beyond.
Thebasic mechanism is simple.Consider the extreme case of
"perfect" capital mobilitywith no artificial barriers tointernational
capital movements. In this caseworld saving would flow into onecen-
tral pool——the international capital
market——and then be allocated to
investment in national economiesaccording to differentialreal returns
and risks. The amount of investment anygiven countrycould
draw from the pool would depend on
its real rate of return.If a major
country such as the ij.s.significantly increased itsdemand on the sav-
ing pool, it would probably
reduce the flow to the developingcountries.
On the other hand, i it
increased saving it would increasethe flow to
the developing countries.Let us briefly examinehow this international
saving_investment link works toinfluence investment and growthin the
U.S. and in the developing
countries, using a few examplesof potentiallY
relevant events.13.
(a) Increase in U.S. saving.
A policy that increases the U.S. saving ratio would increase the
world saving pool, and increase investment in developing countries
and in the U.S. by their marginal shares of the pool.
(b) Increase in U.S. investment.
An increase in U.S. investment could be achieved by increasing
the U.S. real rate of return, perhaps through tax incentives.
Through the world saving—investment channel, this would increase
investment in the U.S. and reduce investment in the developing
countries, holding world saving constant. Of course, through
the demand—side links this might be offset by an expansion of
income and saving in the U.S., which could also offset the ef-
fect through the saving—investment channel, but only partially.
(c) Increase in developing country productivity.
This is the effect studied in detail by Lipton—Sachs (1980) in
their more sophisticated model of the world saving—investment
mechanism. An increase in the real rate of return in developing
countries will shift the allocation of saving toward investment
in the developing countries, and away from investment in the
U.S.
(d) Shift in world distribution of income.
The increase in the real price of oil shifted the world dis-
tribution of income from the U.S. and developing countries and
toward the oil—exporters. If we assume that the latter's14.
saving rate exceeds those of the importers, which seems to be
the case, this will increase the world saving rate. Invest-
ment in the developing countries will then rise by their mar-
ginal share of the world saving pooi. This seems to havebeen
an important effect in the 197Os, as developing countriesmain-
tained investment and growth rates by borrowing in the euro—
markets while the OECD world went into stagnation. We will re-
view this evidence more thoroughly in Section III below.
In addition to the simple effect of an increase in world saving,
the shift of the locus of saving toward OPEC probably increasedthe im-
portance of the supply—side link by increasingthe international mobility
of capital. The OPEC surplus tends to go to the Eurouiarketswhich are
major suppliers of funds to the developing countries.In a sense, the
shift toward OPEC has increased the degree to which saving andinvestment
are internationalized. This has weakened the dependenceof developing
countries on bilateral links and OECD growth.
Each of the examples (a) —(d)discussed the effect of a single shift
in saving or investment. One could combine these to analyzethe effects
of simultaneous shifts. In general, the results of combinationsof events
in one area for growth in other areas of the worldwill depend on the
originating area's net draw on the world saving pool.If a change in
tax policy in the U.S. increases saving and investment,U.S. growth
will increase. If saving rises more than investment,the world saving15.
pool will increase, on balance, and investment will rise in the de-
veloping countries. If an increase in efficiency in the developing
countries raises their saving and investment, their growth rates will
rise. The result for U.S. investment and growth will depend on whether
saving increased more than investment in the developing countries. Thus
an event can, in general, benefit all if it raises saving more than invest-
ment locally, adding to the world saving pool on balance.
III. Empirical Evidence from the 1970s
The demand—side mode? of section Il—A would lead us to expect that
growth in GNP in developing countries would be closely tied to growth in the
industrial countries. The supply—side model of section lI—B would shift
the focus of interdependence toward the international capital markets. It
would suggest more independence of developing country growth rates from
those of industrial countries, and more dependence in international saving
flows. Here we review the evidence from the 1970s, and conclude that a
shift toward thinking along the lines of the supply—side model is appropriate
for the 1980s.
A. Real Growth Rates and Terms of Trade
Table 1 presents a sununary of global growth rates for the period
1950—77. In the data on GNP per capita, we see industrialized countries'
growth rising from 2.5 percent per year in the decade 1950-60 to 4 percent
in 1960—70, and then falling back to 2.4 percent in 1970—77. The low—
income developing countries follow a roughly similar pattern, although
their pattern within the 1960—70 decade was quite different from that of
the industrialized countries. It is interesting to note that the 1950—60










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































he ic—income developingcountries ehibiaquite different
p€c, :ever. Their per capita growth rate ro• from 2.8 percent
ir. thc 1950s to 3.5cnd4.0percent inthe first and second halves of
the16Ds, respectively, itthenfell to 3.4 percent in 1970—77.
Thus n the ]950s the middle—income countries grew at a 2.8 percent
rate when the industrial countries grew at 2.5 percent. However, in
the ic7s, the middle—income countriec grew at 3.4 percent with an
industrial country growth rate of 2.4 percent.
in the breakdown in the bottom halfofTable 1, we see that the
slowdown in the 1970s in the industrial countries was followed In
Africa, South Asia, and Southern Europe, but not in East Asia or
latin America. This Is consistent with the middle—income vs. low—
Income experience.
More detail on growth of real GNPisgiven in Table 2.There
we see that the 1974—75 recession in the Industrial countries was
followed by the African countries, and perhaps with a year's lag In
LatinAmerica. Oil—importing developing countries, as agroup, show
amild growth slowdown in 1974—75, in contrast to the industrial
country recession.Low—income countries experienced the slowdown In
1974, and manufactures importers in 1975. But In general, the data
swmuch more stable growth inreal output in the oil—importing
developing countries than In the industrial countries In the 1970s.
At the bottom of Table 2, we shw fluctuations in the terms of
trade In the industrial countries, OPEC, and non—oil developing
countries.In 1974 we see the junp on the OPEC terms of trade,
reflected in a drop In the other two areas. The recession of 1975 in18.
the industrial countries raised their termsof trade by 2.5 percent,
at the expense of OPEC and thenon—oil developing countries. The
recovery of 1976—77 in theindustrial countries reduced their terms
of trade, to the benefit of the other two.In every year from 1975
to1978 the non—oil developing countries' terms oftrade moved inthe
oppositedirectionto the industrial countries!
The data of Tables 1 and 2 suggest thefollowing generaliza-
tions.
(a)In the 1970s, fluctuations in output in theindustrial
countriescaused similar fluctuations in non—oil developing
countries' terms of trade.
(b) Fluctuations inrealoutput in the non—oil developing
countrieswere much smaller than those in theindustrial
countries.
(c)The middle—income developing countriesseemed less sensitive
to output fluctuations in the industrialcountriesthan were
thelow—income countries.
These generalizations implythat in the 1970s middle—income
developing countries were able to stabilize outputgrowth relative to
industrial countries' fluctuations, whichshowedup in movements in
the terms of trade. This would be consistentwith the supply—side
model. However, the behavior of the low—incomecountries seems




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data on external borrowing by developing countries in the 1970s
support this conclusion. Over the period since 1973, the cumulative deficit
of the DCs has approximately equalled the cumulative surplus of OPEC. The
data are shown in Table 3, borrowed from Cohn Bradford (1981). The cum-
ulative OPEC surplus is $453.8 billion, and the cumulative DC deficit is
$415.9 billion. Thus in effect, the developing countries borrowed the
OPEC surplus.
Details for borrowing by the newly industrializing countries (NICs)
among the developing countries (DC—NICs), and a group of countriesiden-
tified by Bradford (1981) as "next tier" NICs are shown in Table 4.
There we show external public debt in billions of dollars and as a per-
cent of GNP, and the debt—service ratio, in 1970 and 1978 (end of year)
for low—income and middle income countries.
Among the 38 countries listed by the World Bank as "low—income,"
India, Pakistan, and Indonesia were by far the major international debtors
in 1979. Their total of $37 billion in 197 was about 63% of the aggregate
$57 billion for low—income countries; the next largest low—income debtor
in 1979 was Zaire, with $3.8 billion.
In 1970, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia together owed $13.4 billion
Out of an aggregate of approximately $17 billion for the low—income countries.
Thus during the l970s, among the low—income countries the debt of these
"big three" increased from $13.4 to $37 billion; the debt of the rest of
the 38 countries increased from about $3.6 billion to $19 billion. While
India, Pakistan, and Indonesia remained the major borrowers, intexnatinal
debt finance showed a significant increase among the rest of the low—
income group.21.
TABLE3:SummaryofCurrent Account Balances: 1973—1981
(In Billions of U.S. Dollars)
TOTAL
1973 1974 197519761977 1978197919801981 1974—1981
OPEC 6.6 67.8.35.040.031.1 3.368.4112.2 96.0453.8
NON-OIL
LDCs —11.5—36.8 —46.5 —32.9 —29.6 —37.1 —56.1 —80.4—96.5 —415.9
LDC/CJPEC (54.3)(132.9)(82.3%)(95.2%) —(82.O)(71.7%)(1OO%)91.6%
LNDL'STRIAL
COUNTRIES19.3 —12.417.1 —2.].—5.30.1 —10.7 —44.0—29.5
IC/OPEC (18.3%) (5.3%) (17.9%) —(15.6%)(39.2Z)(30.7%)
Source: International Monetary Fund, World EconomicOutlook, Occasional
Paper No. 4, Washington, D. C., June, 1981, Table14, p. 123.22.
TABLE 4: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS
Country or External Public Debt Debt Service
Group $billion % of GNT Ratio a
1970 1979 1970 1979 1970 1978
DC—NI Cs
Low—income
India 7.9 15.6 14.8 12.3 20.9 9.5
Middle—Income
S. Korea 1.8 14.7 20.9 24.5 19.413.5
Taiwanb 0.6 2.9 10.6 12.1 4.5 4.4
Hong Kong 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.0
Singapore 0.2 1.3 7.9 14.8 0.6 1.3
Brazil 3.2 35.1 7.2 17.7 12.434.6
Argentina 1.7 8.7 7.6 8.6 21.515.5
Mexico 3.2 28.8 9.7 24.5 24.1 64.1
NEXT TIER
Low—income
Indonesia 2.4 13.3 27.1 28.3 6.913.4
Pakistan 3.1 8.0 30.5 38.5 23.612.0
Middle—income
Malaysia 0.4 3.0 10.0 15.4 3.6 4.7
Philippines 0.6 5.2 9.2 17.3 7.512.6
Thailand 0.3 2.7 4.9 9.9 3.3 4.2
Columbia 1.2 3.4 18.1 12.6 11.612.5
Notes:
a. Ratio of debt service to exports of goods and services
b. Data for Taiwan are for 1970 and 1978, since Taiwan does not appear in
the 1981 World Development Report
Source: World Development Report, 198123.
The really major borrowers in the 1970s were, however, the 52
countries listed by the World Bank as "middle—income." Their total
external public debt was approximately $250 billion at the end of 1979.
These countries all show major debt expansion in the 1970s as they
borrowed to finance investment and growth.
C. Investment and Growth
The data on investment and real GDP growth in the NICs and record—
tier NICs,aresummarized in Table 5. We show growth rates of real GD?
andgrossdomestic investment for the decades 1960—70 and 1970—79.—'
Investment as a percentage of GD? is shown in the last two columns for
1960 and 1979.
In more than half the countries in Table 5, the growth rates of real
CDP and real investment rose in the 1970s relative to the 1960s. In almost
all cases, the growth rate of investment was larger than that of GD? in
the 1970s. And in all cases the investment —GD?ratio was larger in 1979
than in 1960, usually showing a big increase.
The data thus show a substantial rise in investment in the NICs and
next—tier countries in Table 5, financed by the increase in borrowing
shown in Table 4. These coUntries borrowed the OPEC surplus and invested
it. The result was a maintenance or increase in growth in the l970s in
the face of the OECD slowdown.
/Note that Taiwan is not in Table 5 since it no longer appears in













India 3.4 3.4 5.5 5.8 17 24
Middle—Income
S. Korea 8.6 10.3 23.6 14.9 11 35
Bong Kong 1.0 9.4 6.9 12.5 18 28
Singapore 8.8 8.4 20.5 6.0 11 39
Brazil 5.4 8.7 7.0 10.1 22 23
Argentina 4.2 2.5 4.1 3.0 22 26
Mexico 7.2 5.1 9.6 6.9 20 28
NEXT TIER
Low income
Indonesia 3.9 7.6 4.6 14.8 8 23
Pakistan 6.7 4.5 6.9 0.6 12 18
Middle—income
Malaysia 6.5 7.9 7.2 10.3 14 25
Philippines 5.1 6.2 8.2 10.6 16 29
Thailand 8.2 7.7 15.8 7.7 16 28
Colombia 5.1 6.0 4.5 5.5 21 24
Source: World Development Report, 198125.
IV. Structural Interdepefldefl!Betyrtthe U.S.
During the 1970s the US and thedeveloping economies, especially
those which are rapidly—growingand jdustrialiZiflg, have
developed another type of interdependence,which we will call
'structural interdependence.' This isthe type of interdependence
contetplated by classical or neo—classiCaltrade theory, in which
econies specialize along lines ofcnparatiVe advantage in produc-
tion, andthentrade with each other to obtain adiversified consump-
tion bundle. in standard trade theory,allgoodsare final goods, so
complementarities are achieved by specializationin production of
final goods.
Iii U.S. trade, however, there is anincreasing trend toward
specialization iii production of capitalgoods, chemicals, and agri-
cultural product, in exchange for importsof fuel, autos, and cori
sumer goods. These trends aredocumented in Branson (1980). A
suzunary is provided in subsectionA below.
In its trade with developing countries,the U.S. has rapidly
growing exportsofcapital goods and imports ofconsutnei goods. As
the developing countries industrialize,they import U.S. capital
goods. In 1980 the U.S. surplus ontrade in capital goods reached
approximatelY $45 billion. In exchange,the U.S. imports final
consumer goods. This is an exampleof comparative advantage at work,
making the two sets of econcxniesstructurally cczipletnefltarY, or
interdependent. The result is increasingefficiency, in general, but
if the process moves too quickly it cangenerate significant adjust
ment costs.In subsect{on B below we look at the growth in capital goods
exports to developing countries, and in subsection C we look at U.S.
consumer goods imports. Section D summarizes.
26.27.
A.The Composition of U.S. Trade
At the end of World War II, the pattern of U.S. trade was distorted
by the fact that industrial capacity had been significantly reduced in
the other major advanced countries. Trade in consumcr goods provides a
good example of this distortion. In every year from 1925 to 1938 the
U.S. was a net importer of consumer goods. But in 1946 the U.S. emerged
from the war as a net exporter, and in 197 the surplus on consumer
goods was $1 billion. As industrial capacity was rebuilt in Europe and
Japan, the surplus sbrank teai1v, and in 1959 the U.S. aain bec&me a
ret importer, with a deficit in consumer goods that has grom steadil':
since then. This example is typical of the pattern we see in the
long—run data on the composition of trade. During the years since 1950
the composition of U.S. trade has moved back toward its longer—run base
of comparative advantage. By the mid—l960s we see growing surpluses in
trade in capital goods, chemicals, and agriculture, and deficits in con-
sumer goods and non-agricultural industrial supplies and materials. Trade
in automotive products switched from surplus to deficit in 1968.The
evolution of the composition of U.S. trade is discussed in detail in
Branson (1980).
The U.S. trade position in 1980 is an extension of the trends
detailed there; it is summarized in Table 6. There we showTABLE 6:U.S. TRADE, 1979—80
($billions,annual rates)
Source: Survey of Current Business,6/81,





Agricultural 35.6 17.4 18.2 42.2 18.1 24.1
Non-Agricultural 151.9 194.4 -42.5 185.1 231.2 46.1
Non—Agricultural
Industrial supplies
and materials 52.1 110.4 -58.3 64.8 134.5 69.7
Petroleum 2.0 60.5 -58.5 2.8 78.9 -76.1
Chemicals 14.5 4.5 10.0 17.8 5.2 12.6
Capital Goods 58.8 24.6 34.2 74.1 30.3 43.8
Autos 18.2 25.5 -7.3 17.3 27.1 -9.8
Consumer Goods 12.8 30.6 -17.8 16.7 34.4 —17.7
Military 3.0 — 3.0 3.3 — 3.3
Other 7.0 3.3 3.7 8.9 4.9 4.029.
U.. trade in 1979 and 1980, by major end—use categories. The
patterns of surpluses and deficits are instructive.
The surpluses in capital goods and chemicals have grown since the
period just after World War II. These are clear areas of comparative
advantage. The deficit on consumer goods we already have discussed;
that on autos has existed since 1968. The deficit on petroleum is ob—
vious, and the agricultural surplus became a major element also around
1974.
If we aggregate the data slightly differently, we see more clearly
the post—1974 adjustment in U.S. trade. In 1979, the deficit on trade
in petroleum of $58 billion was substantially offset by surpluses of
$18 billion in agriculture and $16 billion in non—petroleum manufac-
tures, leaving a net trade deficit of $24 billion. In 1980, the petro-
leum deficit was $76 billion, but the agricultural surplus was $24 billion
and the manufactures surplus was $30 billion, leaving a net deficit of
$22 billion.
Thus the petrpleum deficit is largely offset by surpluses in agri-
culture and manufacturing. Within maiiufacturing there is a clear division
by comparative advantage, with a very large and gro'ing surplus in capital
goods and smaller but significant deficits on consumer goods and autos
and a surplus in chemicals. In its trade in manufactured goods the U.S.
is becoming increasingly specialized alorg lines of comparative advantage.30.
The U.S. economy has responded to the oil priceincrease, which is
generating a $76 billion deficit by 1980, byexpanding its trade sur-
pluses along its lines of comparative advantage.The degree of adjust-
ment is indeed quite remarkable; by 1980the total trade deficit was
$22 billion. The movement in the real exchangerate helped, improving
the U.S. competitive position. Thus it appearsthat adjustment has
worked well in the U.S.31.
B. U.S. Exports of Capital Goods to Developing Countries
A striking development in U.S. trade in the 1970s was the
acceleration of growth in capital goods exports and the surplus in
trade in capital goods, which was nearly $45 billion by 1980.During
the mid—1970s there was a quantum jump in U.S. exports of capital
goods to oil exlxrters and to industrializing developing countries
rFranson (19O), p. 220]. Growth in capital goods exports to these
countries continues to increase, and should provide an area of
strength for U.S. trade on the 1980s. Rapid growth in manufacturing
capacity in the developing countries is clearly good for the exercise
of U.S. ccparative advantage in capital goods exports.
Table 7 presents data on U.S.exports of capital goods, in
constant 1979 dollars. Table 8 presents the growth ratesummary of
the data in Table 7.In Table 7 we see rapid growth inspurts through-
out the period since 1965. The period 1965—72saw fairly steady growth
from $13.6 billion to $24 billion (1979dollars). Then there was a jump
in three years to $43.5 billion in 1975,a pause to 1977, and then an-
other jump to $67.2 billion in 1980.
The data for exports to the developing countries showdiffering
patterns of growth in the l970s. To Latin America we seea doubling
of exports in 1972—75, a pause,and anotherjump in 1977—80. The major
period of growth in exports to the Near East ended in 1976. The
growth in South Asia has been irregular, with asurge in 1976—80.
Southeast Asia resembles Latin America, with thejump in 1972—75, a
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in 1976, with a jump in 1980. The general impression is that exports of
capital goods to the Near East and Africa follow jumps in theoil price,
and that exports to Latin Pnerica and South and Southeast Asia are tied
to growth in manufacturing output in those areas. In 1970, exports to
the developing areas shown in Table 7 were 30 percent of total capital
goods exports; in 1973 this share was 32 percent, and by1980 it was up
to 42 percent.
Table 8 gives the growth rate summary for total capital goods.
Let us focus on the period 1973—80. During this period U.S.real GNP
grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent.In Table 8 we see that total capital
goods exports grew at 11.2 percent, substantiallyfaster than total
real demand. Since the share of exports to developing countries was
rising over the period, they were growing faster yet.As we run across
the columns in Table 8 for 1973—80, we see that exportsof capital goods
to each developing—country area except Africa grew fasterthan the total.
Thus in the 1970s growth in capital goods exports wasmuch faster than
growth in total U.S. demand, and the share of thedeveloping countries
as a market for capital goods exports grew.Growth in manufacturing
capacity in the developing countries, based significantlyon international
borrowing, appeared as demand for exports of capital goodsin the U.S.C. U.S. Imports of Consumer Goods from Developing Countries
U.S. imports of non—automotive consumer goods have alsogrown
increasingly rapidly in the l970s. By 1980 the overall deficit in
trade in this category was $18 billion, small in cnparison to the
capital goods surplus, but still significant. U.S. imports from
developing countries grew from 25 percent of total non—automotive
consumer goods imports in 1970 to 52 percent in 1980. Thus as U.S.
imports of consumer goods fr developing countriesgrew in the
l970s, U.S. exports to them provided the basis forexpanding these
consumer good industries. To some extent, the growth of consumer
goods imports in the U.S. released resources to provide for the
expansion of capital goods exports. The U.S. economy became
increasingly interdependent with the economies of the developing
countries through this pattern of growth in trade.
Table 9 presents the data in U.S. imports ofnon—automotive
consumer goods, in constant 1979 dollars, and Table 10 gIves the
growth rate suixary of the data in Table 9.
In Table 9 we see fairly steady growth in totalimports of
non—automotive consumer goods except the recessionyear of 1975 and
the growth recession that began in 1979. In the data forimports
from Latin America we see a quadrupling from1970—74, a drop in 1975
and more gradual growth since. Imports from the NearEast and South
Asia slxw steadier growth paths, with South Asia thesteeper. Im—






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































then doubled again to 1980. Importsfrom Africa increased six—fold
over the period 1970—80. Theshare of the LDCs in total U.S. imports
of non—automotive consumer goods ran from25 percent in 1970 to 33
percent in 1973 and 52 percentin 1980. Their total of $16.3billion
in 1980 was much less than U.S. exportsof capital goods to them ——
$28billion in 1980.
The growth rate summary of Table 10 showsU.S. total imports of
non—automotive consumer goods growing at anannual rate of 6 percent
1973—80, again faster than total realdemand. Imports from each
developing country area grew substantiallyfaster, as their share
increased. Thus as manufacturing capacity grewin the developing
countries in the 1970s, their output found amarket in the U.S.
D. Sumrny
Inits trade with developing countriesin the l970s, the U.S.
has become increasingly complementaryand specialized. The overall
composition of U.S. trade, reviewedin subsection A, has moved in-
creasingly toward export surpluses incapital goods, agricultural
goods, and chemicals, withdeficits in autos, consumer goods,and
fuels. By 1980, the U.S. had surpluses onthe order of $25—30 billion
on manufactured goods and agriculture.39.
In its trade with the developing countries, the U.S. Is increas-
ingly an exporter of capital goods and an importer of consumer goods,
with a surplus on this exchange of about $26 billion in 1980. This
fits well with basic notions of comparative advantage, and it
reflects an efficient re—allocation of resources in the U.S.
This increase in structural interdependence with the developing
countries also fits nicely into the picture of interdependence at the
macro level. As the industrializing developing countries borrow in-
ternationally to finance growth, they buy capital goods from the U.S.
In turn their manufactured consumer goods find a market in the U.S.
The picture of interdependence through capital markets and through
industrial structure is consistent and probably efficient in the long
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